Cross-Border Terrorism

The Boko Haram insurgency has taken deep roots in Nigeria with an ever-expanding range. The insurgents’ operations can be traced back to 2011 through a campaign of violence, and over time their sphere of influence is no longer confined within Nigeria but across borders. The predominant region for their operations in the Lake Chad Basin: Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon, which have been drawn into tackling the security threat operating transborder. A classic case is the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) set up by the LCB countries to wage war against jihadist terrorists in the region.

Within Nigeria, the abduction of the Chibok girls in April 2014 was one of many attacks by the insurgents. This incident sparked international condemnation and attention to the insurgency. Beyond the Nigerian border, the Boko Haram insurgents have been as prevalent in Southern Niger as in North East Nigeria. The deadly attack on Bosso claimed 32 lives in 2015. However, a recognition of the insurgent group’s activities transborder was brought to light through their abduction activities in Cameroon in 2013. The expansion of these insurgents stems from the porosity of the borders in the lake chad region. This region’s poorly manned borders and economic decline have created an enabling environment for transborder movement.  

The efforts towards eliminating Boko Haram and, much more recently, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) threat have brought about the need for multilateralism among the Lake Chad Basin countries. As such, the insurgent groups became a priority in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). This form of multilateral relations became necessary from recognising that approaching the threat through combined efforts could yield better results. True to form, combined efforts have yielded results in curtailing the spread in 2015 and 2016. Despite this win, more than three factions emanated and have continued through various campaigns of violence, worsening the state of affairs.

Furthermore, as with any confederal structure, the association of the Lake Chad Basin states through the MNJTF lacks a central body that ensures compliance. As such, a hesitance to comply with the deployment of troops as and at when due remains a significant obstacle to the fight against the militants. In addition, the MNJTF mandate of securing civilian lives and protecting human rights has been continually violated. Such violations have soured the relationship between the local populace and the security forces in the Lake Chad basin region and have hampered cooperation in addressing the security threat.

Over the years, a long-standing disagreement on whether the insurgency is a regional or Nigerian problem has hampered the dedication towards a united approach to the security crisis. Chad, Cameroon and Niger view the insurgency as a Nigerian problem from which they have suffered collateral damage largely stemming from Nigeria’s inability to arrest the threat. Nonetheless, the violent insurgency has kept all countries involved on edge in the scramble to curtail violent attacks.

Despite previously existent measures to address the insurgency, there is a need for enhanced intelligence flow between the Lake Chad states for rapid response to the threat. Strengthening the alliance amongst the lake chad states can begin with proper border protection funding. Furthermore, with the persistence of Boko haram activities, a holistic approach must be adopted where united military action must accompany swift and efficient stabilisation measures to avoid counterproductive actions. While law enforcement, in their fight against terror, should abstain from human rights violations, thus establishing confidence in the local populace.

On the border front, countries of the Lake Chad Basin must step up to regulate border points, especially illegal entry routes that have provided safe passage for the smuggling of arms and armed groups’ movement. There is a need to address the easy border access non-state armed groups enjoy. West African countries must have a multilateral commitment to improving border management in their respective states independently. For example, the rise of violence across the LCB will be better managed if conflict-impacted nations upscale border control measures through investments in border protection technology. Committed states with effective border strategies can share intelligence that will aid the security of other states.