\”Patriotic Bullets\”

Nine civilians were recently killed by “patriotic bullets” of the Nigerian Airforce (NAF) in Yobe state, one of the least affected of BAY (Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe) states of the Boko Haram carnage. While NAF has instituted an inquiry into the incident, the error shooting adds to the list of concerns in the terror-troubled northeast Nigeria. First, residents are trapped in a seemingly unending war and the attendant humanitarian crisis, having lost loved ones, homes, and sources of livelihood. Second, the region is still vulnerable to insurgents’ attacks and counterterrorism missions by the Nigerian Forces. Third, there is widespread discontent on the government’s move to reintegrate low-risk repentant terrorists into communities that may have experienced the harsh realities of the jihadist war. Fourth, the error shooting may create hostilities against security agencies in the region and further strain mutual relationships that are instrumental in winning the war on terror.

Error bullets too many. In January 2017, NAF fighter jets mistakenly bombed an IDP camp in Borno state, killing at least 54 people. Statement from NAF headquarters held that the location was not “reflected in the operational map as a humanitarian base.” In June 2021, NAF denied killing wedding guests during an aerial bombardment against bandits in Niger state, a bandits’-rampaged state. In April 2021, NAF said it had commenced investigations into a report that its officials killed 20 Nigerian Army personnel by accident in an airstrike in Mainok, Borno state. According to the International Centre for Investigative Reporting (ICIR), some of the unreported airstrikes by the military had killed, injured, and displaced many residents in Zamfara state.

Given growing public discontent, Nigeria must get its counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations right. Current issues in the northeast are impacting collaborative opportunities to end the war. Erroneous airstrikes by the Nigerian forces will further strain the civil-military relationship that will aid counterinsurgency measures and set the tempo for post-conflict recovery and stabilisation. New conversations and efforts across national governments, international organisations, and the donor community on post-conflict stabilisation in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) cannot be achieved by increasing hostility between the military and society. Nigerian military should enhance its intelligence gathering. Details of the recent NAF killing of noncombatants in Yobe state suggests minimal coordination between military fighter jets and on-ground information sources.

Government should improve its local presence. Counter-ideology against Boko haram should be followed by improving the living conditions of people in the region. Boko haram insurgents struggling to create an Islamic state may be promising local people improved lives and leveraging the government’s inadequacies to expand their plan. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) holds that states should address and resolve local grievances, increase community trust in government, and encourage social cohesion in counter-extremism. Social welfare and development programmes are few ways government can mobilise local support and collaboration in the war against terror. Ideology-driven warfare must be met with a counter-ideology strategy. Essentially, improving local governance will aid civil-military partnerships and create opportunities for intelligence gathering necessary for counterterrorism.