\”Returnee Terrorists\”

“Repentant terrorists” continue to make their way into Nigeria’s troubled northeast region, where residents are opposed to having them back. Twelve years of violent jihad in northeast Nigeria and the broader Lake Chad Basin (LCB) have killed about 350,000 people and pushed 2.5 million others into vulnerability. The United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) says the unabated crisis adds to the long history of marginalisation, climate shocks, chronic underdevelopment and poverty. However, many northeast residents are expected to put behind the realities of the jihadist war and current challenges to accept “repentant terrorists” into their midst.

Never-ending surrender. As long as the Nigerian government continue to wage war on terror and equally create safe return opportunities for ‘low-risk jihadist fighters’, surrender by the terrorists may be the new normal. According to the Nigerian Army, about 13,243 repentant jihadist members have returned to the Nigerian side in the last two weeks. This development is attributed to recent air and land operations in the northeast. Moreover, it may also coincide with reported structural changes within the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP). Regardless of the actual trigger behind the mass return of “repentant terrorists”, the focus should be extended to the fate of the returnees in terms of demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration (DDR) and acceptance by northeast residents.

The insurgents’ homecoming is a difficult journey, from disengagement with terrorists for uncertain reasons to the effectiveness of DDR programmes to their fate with hostile communities. The Nigerian government should commit to robust DDR programmes to ensure that returnee fighters do not still hold pro-jihadi sentiments, which may mean they are trojan horses sent to infiltrate the DDR system and communities. This effort will help to unpack why terrorists are returning – on the grounds of repentance, a fallout with ISWAP or other unclear reasons. A tactical approach towards the processing of returnee fighters, will among other things, ensure the victories and post-conflict stabilisation efforts in the northeast are not compromised by seemingly ‘repentant terrorists”.

For community acceptance to take place, communities must be engaged.  A Brookings Institute report holds that many northeast communities do not want the repentant terrorists back. Implementing Operation Safe Corridor as a counterterrorism effort has not received significant public support. Therefore, government must increase consideration of those affected by the insurgency. The Nigerian state must ensure that direct victims of the Boko Haram insurgency accept the principle of dialogue and support the process. The buy-in of Boko Haram-impacted communities and designated resettlement locations will, to a large extent, determine the success of the programme. Government must also pay heed to concerned collective voices in the terror-troubled area. Arguably, the amnesty programme for repentant low-risk Boko Haram members may seem like a good path to peace, and it may also create inherent problems if not well implemented.

Communities must be prepared given the reintegration of ex-jihadist fighters. The timelines for DDR processes should happen simultaneously with conversations with community stakeholders. The conversations should involve robust sensitisation and capacity building workshops and discourses with critical stakeholders who would, in turn, push the counternarrative against hostilities towards returning fighters. It is also important that psychosocial and counselling support is provided to traumatised community members to cope with the war reality.

Increasing development intervention efforts as a post-stabilisation effort and an incentive measure. Ordinarily, development intervention needs to be upscaled in the crisis hotspots and locations where displaced populations seek refuge, considering the impact of the war. An exponential increase in humanitarian aid and post-conflict recovery initiatives will help rebuild lives while also serving as an incentive to forgive the terrorists. It will be hard to preach forgiveness to communities still experiencing the harsh realities of the war. Therefore, adequate measures must be channelled towards lifting millions of northeast residents from the vulnerabilities the jihadist war have brought upon them. Returning terrorists may complicate counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and post-conflict stabilisation efforts if not effectively and sustainably managed by government.