Funding Terror

Boko Haram operations in northeast Nigeria and the broader Lake Chad region has existed for twelve years. With thousands of deaths and millions of displacements in the region, the activities of the insurgents appear unending. Much worse, their sources of finance and recruitment seem limitless. Many link their recruitment pool to the exacerbated human capital deficits in the war-torn area that predisposes many residents to the antics of jihadist fighters. Also, the flow of cash to pursue jihadist ambitions have been connected to their affiliation with other international terrorist organisations, taxing of conquered communities, lootings from community raids, and proceeds from abductions. Besides, there are allegations of private donations, all to the insurgents\’ unrelenting effort to capture state power and entrench its jihadist-fashion of state authority.

Insurgents in the northeast may have survived at least twelve years of counterterrorism due to uninterrupted access to funds. According to the United Nations, terrorists require money to operate, and such funds are used to purchase weapons, equipment, supplies or services.  In 2013, Boko received $3.15 million as ransom to release a French family kidnapped in Cameroon. In November 2020, about six Nigerians, including an unnamed Federal Government official, were reportedly convicted by a court sitting in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for wiring $782,000 to Boko Haram. On September 13, 2021, UAE authorities further put the six Nigerians on terrorist list. The development poses the question, how many Boko Haram and Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) terrorist financiers are out there? It also puts multinational technical and material efforts to end terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin difficult, considering the resources terrorists can access.

The UAE story must move the Nigerian government to look deeper into insurgent financing. The issue has become more imperative as war-weary and under-funded Nigerian troops continually battle resilient terror groups with apparent multiple funding streams. A recent edition of Nextier SPD Weekly suggests a range of recommendations to help the government address the issue in the war against terror. The paper recommends that government and other stakeholders interface with local, regional and international action groups against money laundering and illicit financial flows. Notably, it also adopts the maximum utility of CBN\’s cashless policy in monitoring and tracking large withdrawals and deposits.

Nigeria\’s porous land borders, especially in the North-East and North-West, should be better policed to intercept the deadly weapons brought in through the Sahara Desert and other parts of the Sahel region. More immigration, customs, and police officials with state-of-the-art gadgets should be posted to the areas to manage legal and illegal entry routes. These efforts will help curb the unchecked logistics channels insurgents use to fortify their operations.

Nigeria must cultivate the political will and look into insurgent financing in the country. The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), is a significant international support to criminalise funding for terrorist purposes. This will also serve as a deterrence as culprits will be prosecuted and forced to forfeit their assets. Cutting terrorist financial flows will go a long way to increase the fighting chances of the Nigerian forces, troops of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), and the Civilian Joint Task Force (C-JTF). While the government is reactively waging war against terrorism, demobilising, rehabilitating and reintegrating \’low-risk terrorists, it can also cut the flow of funds that keep them in business and as a menacing threat to durable peace and stability.