Crowding Conflict Theatre

Nigeria is home to volunteer vigilantism and other state-funded armed groups. The rise of armed conflicts across the country and overstretched security agencies have given room for self-help and calls for non-state security alternatives. Jihadist terrorists, bandits, cultists, violent separatists, ‘unknown gunmen’ and hoodlums are spread across the country, leading to violent incidents and fatalities. Nigeria’s security agencies continue to respond to the ubiquity of threats. However, a decline in incidents and deaths appears unending. Several communities are still vulnerable to attacks, and relatively peaceful locations are not immune.

Volatile communities and others around the hotspots seek protection elsewhere and within. Community-led self-defence groups are joining the conflict theatre. Also, state governments are creating regional and state-level security frameworks to combat terror. These efforts are increasing actors in Nigeria’s crowded circle of conflicts. Furthermore, utterances from some high-profile political officeholders encourage the emergence of self-defence groups and the acquisition of weapons for protection. The Nigerian state’s idealistic monopoly of the instrument of violence is punctured by menacing non-state armed actors and, more recently, the rise of ‘unregulated self-defence militias.

The spread of self-defence groups does not assure a peaceful future. Arguably, the increasing need for self-protection suggests the resignation that the Nigerian state is incapable of providing protection despite the social contract. It is also an enabler of a crisis of confidence, where people do not believe a government is working properly and may no longer support it. Therefore, resorting to self-help may be driven by the need for stability, but it may also create additional problems. The International Crisis Group affirms that the spread of vigilante organisations in Nigeria is helping authorities fight crime and insurgency and exacerbating these problems.

Despite filling in for security organisations, the new normal is problematic given Nigeria’s diversity. Several informal security units are formed on identity lines. Therefore, without adequate regulations, such groups may become weaponised and deployed for group conflict. For example, the farmer-herder crisis has often led to armed clashes between the socio-economic groups, with each group claiming self-defence and protection. The Eastern Security Network (ESN) was purported to protect Igbo lives and properties. Self-groups may also be on primitive groups’ interests that threaten the safety of Nigeria’s other demographics. Such scenarios will undermine the security operations of formal institutions and, invariably, Nigeria’s national security.

Armed and unregulated quasi-security units are threats to the 2023 general elections in Nigeria. Nigeria has a history of electoral violence, so elections are keenly contested along identity lines and party affiliations. Since formal security agencies are often indicted for electoral violence, the occurrence may not be different with informal security units, which are significantly under-trained, unregulated and often identity-based. Therefore, there is a need for holistic regulations for the creation and operation of unorthodox securitisation measures across Nigeria. Such regulations should be led by regional and state-level efforts of sub-national governments to establish them. However, the Nigerian Police Force should also provide nationally-backed coverage and regulation of such units.

There is a need for informal security outfits to be regulated in line with conflict and cultural sensitivities in the target areas. Informal security units must hinge on the assumption that such platforms’ idea is to securitise communities and not pique entities against entities. Nigeria’s security crisis is far from checkmated, so informal security actors may continue to increase. Therefore, the creation of supposedly supportive quasi-security units must be preceded by adequate awareness training to enhance the operatives’ knowledge of working in conflict zones. Neutrality, respect for human rights and professionalism will help avoid the looming dangers of tensions between informal security divisions and communities. A robust punishment and reward strategy within the security organisations will help shape the conduct of security personnel in the field. The Nigerian government must tactically regulate the activities of informal security providers to ensure sustainable stability. Informal security units must be fully committed to complementing securitisation efforts rather than complicating them.