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Political activities in Nigeria are in top gear six months before the 2023 general elections. Beyond the politicking and projections, the polity is heating up with zealous online and offline debates among different supporters of the political blocs. Many people view the 2023 polls as a “make or mar moment” for Nigeria’s troubled stability and development. However, early violent clashes appear to suggest a repeat of history regarding ‘fiercely contested’ Nigerian elections. Recently, supporters of the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) clashed in Zamfara state, an area troubled by recurrent armed banditry. The clash left one person dead and 18 others injured. On 17th October 2022, PDP members decried that suspected thugs disrupted their campaign train.

Nigeria has a history of electoral violence, and the upcoming elections may not be different. First, the three major contenders for the presidential slot represent Nigeria’s three dominant ethnic groups. Elections in Nigeria are keenly contested along identity fault lines such as religion, ethnic group and sometimes, geopolitical zones. The build-up of tensions and identity reflections may trigger violent conflicts along these fault lines. Second, Nigeria has many violent conflict hotbeds, so informal security provisions are increasing across the board. In the past, formal security organisations were accused of being partisan and perpetuating electoral violence. The tendencies of partisan securitisation may be higher with the spread of poorly regulated, undertrained and often identity-based informal security groups. Third, the conflict situation may be used as an excuse to overly securitise the polls and stifle political activities. For instance, the Zamfara State Government issued an executive order barring campaigning activities due to insecurity.

Recent incidents of political violence put a question on peace accords before the election. Peace accords have been signed at national and state levels, especially among contenders for the presidential and governorship positions. There have also been instances where the political aspirants met and maintained cordiality and displayed the spirit of sportsmanship. However, how will the symbolic events and encounters cascade to attitudinal change among the various political followers and supporters’ groups? Peace accords do not necessarily translate to peaceful political engagements if followers of political contenders and blocs do not subscribe to them or show signs of commitment. The latter is much more difficult, considering political support is fluid, if not fleeting. Therefore, commitment to peaceful political engagement may change when electoral interest, choice and situation change. Equally, it is arguably impossible to hold every electorate accountable.

Indeed, a peace accord is arguably a misrepresentation of reality if cordiality is only maintained at the aspirants’ level without trickling down to the supporters’ groups and other affiliations, including those with ethnoreligious leanings. At best, it is a projection of what should be rather than what is. Furthermore, political aspirants may not be held liable for the conduct of their supposed followers, especially if there is no evidence of direct or indirect instigation of violence. However, many political contenders, especially those engaging nationally, often raise group sentiments to garner more support. But this trend can trigger more than support. It can heighten group consciousness leading to fierce group struggles based on pre-existing conditions of violent conflict. Managing the tensions and possibility of violence must begin with a multi-stakeholder commitment to peaceful polls.

There is a need for political aspirants and parties to continue conversations of peaceful engagement. This is based on the premise that political aspirants will stay committed to the various peace accords signed. The conversations on peaceful engagements should be supported by Nigeria’s development partners and civil society organisations, who will provide capacity training, sensitisation workshops and campaigns targeted at political parties, support groups and other stakeholders involved in the electioneering activities. The essence is to cascade the elements of the peace accord down to individual supporters. Although total success may be unlikely, the engagements will help water down the disposition to non-peaceful means during the election cycle.

Nigeria’s security organisations must maintain non-partisanship in the 2023 general elections. Ongoing violent conflicts are already stretching their technical and resource limits, and further breakdown of law and order will worsen the nation’s security framework. Security organisations’ responsibility to the election should also include regulation of informal security units that may be used as political weapons. While relevant Nigerian agencies should prepare for hitch-free 2023 polls, the government should live up to its statutory obligation to protect people and their properties. Managing the current wave of terror in the country. A real-time conceptualisation and analysis of current security dynamics in the hotspots will help map out effective security measures that can manage the propensity of violence and prevent losses to lives and livelihoods. Beyond the elections, the government must save lives and properties from further losses.

Stability within Nigeria’s election window lies on most stakeholders, from the aspirants down to the electorates, committing to peaceful engagements. Nigeria’s diversity and current security challenges should also be considered in the political discourses and activities. Peaceful polls are largely guaranteed by responsible and transparent engagement from all stakeholders.

About 600 people have died from one of Nigeria’s worst flooding crises. September and October 2022 came with flooding disasters across many Nigerian states. Nigeria’s Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development (MHADMSD) disclosed that beyond the death toll, about 2,407 persons were injured, and while 121,318  houses were partially damaged, 82,053 homes were fully destroyed. Also, while 108,392 hectares of farmlands have been significantly destroyed, about 332,327 more hectares are completely damaged across the nation. Several communities have been submerged, leading to forced displacement and humanitarian crises.

Nigeria’s flooding crisis comes during food insecurity and economic malaise. A report by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) in March 2022 held that about 19.4 million Nigerians would face food scarcity between July and August 2022. This prediction will likely extend beyond the timeline and, equally, include more people given the intensity of flooding and destruction of farmlands nationwide. Furthermore, the ubiquity of violence is already troubling many farming communities, disrupting farming cycles and preventing farmers from accessing their farmlands. Flooding will add more pressure to the troubled agricultural activities in the country and, by extension, the price of food items. Beyond the floods and displacements, affected communities will have a hard time recovering from the losses, given that their homes and sources of livelihood have been destroyed.

The humanitarian challenges of the flood crisis will add more pressure to resource and identity-based conflicts in Nigeria. About 2 million people are displaced due to the current flooding disasters across Nigeria. There is a likelihood of more undocumented and unreported displacement data. The displaced population will seek assistance in areas outside of their zone, which are often overstretched camps and hostile host communities. Also, given that host communities did not anticipate the influx of vulnerable people or are inadequately supported, struggle over limited resources may lead to new conflicts and displacements. Recall that Nigeria is witnessing a protracted conflict between farmers and pastoralists, with land access being the bone of contention. The destroyed farmlands and grazing routes will add more pressure on both economic groups’ struggle for resources, leading to potential violent conflicts.

Furthermore, the current flooding threatens Nigeria’s 2023 general elections. With 2 million people, a portion of Nigeria’s voting population, already displaced as of October 17th, 2022, the victims may seek refuge in places outside their polling units, which means that they may be automatically disenfranchised if they are unable to return before the polls. Also, abandonment of the flooding sites, destruction of road infrastructure, schools, and village halls often designated as polling booths may mean that voting activities are unlikely to occur in these places, except Nigeria’s electoral umpire makes additional provisions for newly displaced voters and disaster zones. Given that the return and resettlement of northeast residents displaced by insurgency have been slow but steady over the years, swift return of flooding victims is arguably unlikely, especially if there is inadequate humanitarian support to aid their resettlement and reintegration.

While the Federal Government of Nigeria is beckoning state governments to take more responsibility in managing the flood disaster, there is a need to push for support from the development agencies and private sector. The flooding crisis will affect existing programmes around climate change, humanitarian challenges, displacement and food insecurity. There is a need to mobilise local and international stakeholders working in the space toward a holistic response strategy to manage immediate humanitarian needs while devising sustainable solutions to address its aftermath, which includes provisions for the displaced population, arranging for their return and resettlement.

The flooding crisis is both a climate issue and an institutional deficit. According to a recent Nextier Policy Weekly, Nigeria must build the capacity of its disaster management institutions to prevent and reduce disaster risk by allocating adequate logistics to such institutions to mitigate disaster occurrence through timely interventions. The article also recommends the development of disaster-resilient communities, especially in areas with the likelihood of a flooding crisis. With the support of the private sector, this approach will include the construction and maintenance of physical infrastructure that can withstand disasters and protect lives and livelihoods.

In line with the possibilities of disenfranchised voters due to recent displacement, the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC), Nigeria’s electoral umpire, should devise an evidence-based strategy for ensuring that Nigeria’s flood victims are not disenfranchised. This should lead to a more elaborate system of allowing registered voters to vote regardless of where they find themselves during the polls. Essentially, there is a need to consider the development of in-person and virtual voting options for Nigerian electorates. If not strategically addressed, the displacement incidents resulting from natural disasters and violence will pose representation and disenfranchisement issues in Nigeria’s 2023 general elections.

In recent years, the southeast has been characterised by violent self-rule agitations currently championed by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Several violent incidents recorded in the region have been linked to IPOB by Nigerian security agencies. However, the group have vehemently denied those claims. Also, sit-at-home orders, a feature of the IPOB\’s agitation style, have received widespread compliance in the region given that the enforcers have attacked some defaulters and government forces did not effectively protect lives and livelihoods on designated sit-at-home days. Other reasons for the region\’s stay-at-home compliance may point to perceived sentiments for the group and its quest for emancipation and a sovereign Biafran state.

The arrest and consequent prosecution of IPOB\’s leader, Nnamdi Kanu, did little to calm tensions in the region. On the contrary, the court trial of Mr Kanu brought a fresh wave of agitations with the sit-at-home orders extended beyond election days to include his court appearance days, IPOB designated memorable events and other times, for some \’arbitrary reasons\’. A few years earlier, IPOB\’s activities were arguably less non-combative until the creation of its armed wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN). ESN was purportedly created to protect Igbo lives and properties, predominantly in the old eastern region. Its creation sped up the establishment of the Ebubeagu, a southeast regional informal security network. However, it also led to repressive efforts from the Nigerian government, in which the Presidency holds an indissolubility stance on the nation\’s unity. As a result, recurrent reports from the region include combative operations, anecdotal accounts of extra-judicial killings, assassinations, kidnapping, attacks on security formations and other government establishments, accusations of human rights abuses, court appearances, and discourses on the marginalisation and secession question.

The discharge of Nnamdi Kanu by Nigeria\’s Court of Appeal on October 13th, 2022, may suggest a dousing of the region\’s tensions. However, such hopes may be premature. Before Kanu\’s arrest, clashes between IPOB and the Nigerian forces had gone violent, with the Nigerian military\’s reported attack on Kanu\’s country home in 2017. There were also other violent incidents between separatists and security forces in the region. This incident at Kanu\’s country home has been argued as his reason for jumping bail. Kanu\’s arrest on June 27th 2021, did not stifle the IPOB\’s activities as hinted earlier; instead, a new wave of violent struggles rocked the relatively peaceful southeast region. According to the Nextier Violent Conflict Database, 291 incidents leading to 528 deaths have been recorded in the southeast between June 27th, 2021 and September 30th, 2022. Some recorded incidents have been directly linked to IPOB, mainly by Nigerian security organisations. Some Nextier articles suggest that IPOB may have lost grip of its members and sympathisers, given that sit-at-home orders and enforcements have continued despite IPOB cancelling some of them. There are several instances where IPOB have reportedly denied involvement in the violent attacks or their indictment by Nigeria\’s security organisations. Also, other criminal networks may have taken advantage of the southeast\’s uncertain security atmosphere and the police-versus-IPOB blame game to carry out heinous activities in the region.

Despite the gloomy possibilities, Kanu\’s discharge has positive takeaways and potential. First, it gives a sense of free and fair trial, as recommended by a Nextier article as a non-combative means of dousing violent tensions in the southeast. Second, it may push IPOB members to soft-pedal on \’aggressive\’ approaches to protest Kanu\’s trial and their pursuit of self-determination. Third, it may motivate IPOB to be open for dialogue should the federal government show willingness to non-conflict interventions. Fourth, a reduction in tensions, \’lesser\’ sit-at-home days and jubilations on Kanu\’s release will likely prevent more fatalities, help achieve relative stability in the region and address the socio-economic implications of the stay-at-home announcements. But, first, the Nigerian government and other relevant regional stakeholders must deploy some measures.

Addressing the southeast\’s violence requires evidence and local engagement. Interventions in the region must be based on analysing the tracked incident information. It will provide insights for intervening actors on violence triggers, the modus operandi of armed actors and periods of attacks. This will also help identify and classify the violent actors. As mentioned in the preceding, other criminal elements, either secession group factions or independent actors, are likely capitalising on the uncertain security climate in the region. Therefore, a robust analysis of the data from the area will provide evidence for the government and relevant actors to intervene and manage the crisis. Reliable data and local intelligence will guide combative responses and ensure they do not complicate the security situation.

There is a need to commit more to non-conflict intervention approaches in addressing the region\’s issues. As recommended in Nextier Policy Weekly, there is an urgent need to have separate dialogues with the two critical actors–the IPOB and the Federal Government–involved in the conflict. The dialogue should yield two critical outcomes which must take place to mark the beginning of the restorative process. The idea of dialogue is to discourage resorting to violence and encourage communicative engagement to document and address the region\’s multi-layered issues.

Arguably, being armed distinguishes armed groups from other types of actors in most political systems. Actors in Nigeria’s violent conflict scenes are increasing, and so is their need for guns. Across the country, multiple hotbeds of violence exist such that the nation’s security framework appears ineffectual in managing the scale and frequency of incidents. Notable cases include the twelve years of jihadist insurgency, evolving banditry,  civil unrest, violent secession struggles, gang wars, kidnapping, inter-communal conflicts, and farmer-herder crises. The Nextier Violent Conflict Database recorded 1,185 incidents leading to 4,192 deaths in the first eight months of 2022.

Increasing violence and its propensity is pushing conversations on self-defence, gun access, and informal security provisions. Many rural communities, highways and ‘ungoverned’ spaces lay vulnerable to non-state armed groups (NSAGs). The violence trajectory has brought about self-defence militias, investments in vigilanteism, and regional security frameworks such as civilian joint task force (CJTF), Amotekun and Ebubeagu in the northeast, southwest and southeast zones, respectively. In the northwest, on June 2022, the Zamfara state government encouraged residents to bear arms and defend themselves against bandits. Also, the Eastern Security Network, the armed unit of the proscribed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), was purportedly set up to protect Igbo lives and the Southeast region from insecurity, especially activities of pastoralists.

State governments in Nigeria appear to be major subscribers of informal security provisioning. Several states are setting up vigilante units and pushing for them to be armed. However, it appears the federal government is unclear on arms procurement for state security outfits. In Ondo state, Governor Akeredolu claims the federal government is showing double standards by allowing the Katsina state security outfit to bear arms and denying the Amotekun of same rights means “we are pursuing one country, two systems.” The emergence of informal security providers means the demand for guns and, possibly, an increase in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

New concerns for the Nigerian state are to review the evolving security dynamics in the country and the responses so far. It is also at the stage that evidence should inform the next steps in determining the security gaps, challenges of the security organisations, and triggers of armed conflicts across Nigeria. Essentially, there is a need to conduct a holistic evaluation of Nigeria’s security crisis. The evaluation will provide evidence for sustainable solutions.

The emergence of informal security provisions in a deeply divided country may become dangerous. Since violence often takes identity dimensions, informal security actors may become agents of group violence, especially if they are armed, undertrained and poorly regulated. There is a need for informal security units to be regulated in line with conflict and cultural sensitivities in the target areas. Informal security units must hinge on the assumption that such platforms’ idea is to securitise communities and not pique entities against entities. Nigeria’s security crisis is far from checkmated, so informal security actors may continue to increase. Therefore, the creation of supposedly supportive quasi-security units must be preceded by adequate awareness training to enhance the operatives’ knowledge of working in conflict zones.

Given the rise of violence and informal security provisions, the Federal Government of Nigeria must take a clear stand on arming such quasi-security units. There is a need to develop a holistic framework for operationalising informal security units such as vigilantes, Amotekun, Ebubeagu, and others. The holistic framework should be flexible and adaptive to the security realities in the intervention areas. This effort will help to curtail perceptions of federal government bias in responding to violent threats in Nigeria.

Conversations on informal security provisions indicate that existing structures are ineffectual in protecting lives and livelihoods. It also suggests a crisis of confidence if residents do not believe that government can protect them; hence, some people may prefer to be in charge of their safety by pushing for gun access and self-defence militias. This trajectory will breed a disconnect between the public and security organisations. Therefore, as an immediate response, the Nigerian government must be willing to hold conversations on revamping Nigeria’s security framework to match the current dynamics of insecurity in the country.

Armed conflicts have become the norm in many of Nigeria’s ungoverned spaces. Ungoverned spaces in Nigeria often refer to locations unreached by the government, hence becoming vulnerable to non-state armed groups (NSAGs). Some experts claim the spread of terror across Nigeria results from limited governance structures in rural locations. In Nigeria, ungoverned spaces and porous borders create havens for marauding non-state armed groups. While the Nigerian government strive to contain security threats, they tend to spread in scale and frequency, intensifying security needs across the nation.

Ungoverned spaces create largely unfettered opportunities for NSAGs to market themselves and undermine government authority. For instance, in 2021, some communities in Niger state negotiated peace deals with insurgents by offering them motorcycles and cash gifts in return for safety. In other cases, terrorists provide makeshift governance frameworks in some communities, imposing taxes and levies and ensuring fragile peace. The unaddressed nature of Nigeria’s ungoverned spaces is a breeding ground for underdevelopment and the spread of non-state armed actors. It also engenders a disconnect between residents in the ungoverned spaces and the government. Due to ungoverned spaces, government’s authority is weakened by the rise and dominance of non-state armed groups who provide an agenda-driven ideology that is often at variance with that of the Nigerian state. The northeast insurgency and banditry in the northwest and northcentral zones are clear cases.

Invariably, Nigeria’s ungoverned spaces can also stem from an uptick in armed conflict and government’s inability to manage violence triggers proactively. For example, the Niger Delta region was arguably a governed space until the exponential rise in violent militancy turned the region into a conflict theatre, reducing semblances of governance structures until an amnesty was extended to agitating militants in 2009. Currently, in southeast Nigeria,  the activities of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and unknown gunmen (UGM) are pushing many locations in the region into an ungoverned status. While formal and informal security arrangements strive to maintain stability in the region, many locations remain vulnerable to criminal gangs. Mondays are still observed as sit-at-home days in the southeast despite government encouraging people to go about their normal activities. Many residents are sympathetic to IPOB’s cause, afraid of disobeying their orders or do not trust security agencies to protect them on Mondays. Hence, the stay-at-orders meet widespread compliance on designated days.

Addressing Nigeria’s ungoverned spaces or preventing its spread must begin with proactive steps. Revitalising the local government administration as an autonomous tier of government is necessary for re-establishing government presence in ungoverned spaces. Unfortunately, many state governors in Nigeria have opted for transition committee chairpersons. Others conduct local government elections, reportedly marred by pre-selection and rigging. These practices are unsustainable and unhealthy for grassroots development and the building of the local economy. Ensuring the existence of local government authority as it has been conceptualised and constitutionalised will ensure a systematic process of grassroots governance, mobilisation and public accountability. It will also form the building blocks for political participation, citizen engagement and engendering public confidence in the government. Nigeria must treat the local government authority as an autonomous third tier of government rather than a political opportunity for state governments to practice their whims and caprices.

Focusing on traditional institutions in Nigeria will help revive local governance. Many Nigerian communities have traditional institutions that predate the Nigerian state. Therefore, it is necessary to identify and support such local structures and key into their local acceptance. International development actors are already identifying and supporting local actors as part of their conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in troubled communities in Nigeria. The Nigerian government should key into this initiative to support traditional institutions as the unofficial fourth tier of government. This will ensure a bottom-up approach to re-establishing government’s local presence and acceptance across the board. Technical and material support provided to traditional institutions will impact kinetic and non-kinetic interventions in conflict-impacted communities. As local stakeholders and potential change agents, traditional leaders will help to broker public trust and state-society security collaborations necessary for sustainable peace and stability.

Managing Nigeria’s porous borders will also help to govern ungoverned spaces and monitor cross-border movements effectively. Illegal borders undermine a nation’s effort to properly securitise its territory and regulate the flow of people, goods and services. Nigeria and some of her West African neighbours suffer from the porosity of their borders. For four decades after ratifying the Protocol on Free Movement for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and related Protocol on transhumance, it has contributed to the indirect promotion of non-state violence, according to a Nextier SPD publication. The Nigerian government must lead the call for a regional partnership for border security. The regional collaboration must prioritise efforts to close and monitor illegal entry points. Managing Nigeria’s ungoverned spaces require a holistic, bottom-up approach to provide governance frameworks in the affected locations.