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Nigeria shares in the security and socio-economic challenges around the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). From the shrinking lake to armed conflicts and the attendant humanitarian crisis in the region. The Boko Haram insurgency has also connected Nigeria with LCB countries such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Given porous borders and other inherent national challenges, the over twelve years of insurgency have become a regional burden. These factors, amongst others, increase neighbourhood effects on the LCB countries. Hence, many affected countries hardly struggle with security and socio-economic challenges in isolation.

The trio of Niger Republic, Cameroon and Chad are in the top twenty most fragile states in the world in 2022, alongside Nigeria. The fragility of these countries predisposes them to encounter local issues from their neighbours. In 2020, President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria held that only God could effectively supervise the borders between his country and the Niger Republic. Such considerations and the narrative of being the ‘giant of Africa’ perhaps moved Nigeria to procure vehicles to aid insecurity containment in the Niger Republic. Beyond security and socio-economic factors, Niger and some parts of Nigeria also share some socio-cultural affinity, especially in pastoral nomadism and religion. The realities between the two countries and other LCB countries mean that inherent local threats should pre-empt readiness from the countries.

State-level threats in West Africa pose concerns for the region. The flow of arms from Libya into the Niger Republic poses a high risk to other West African countries, especially those with internal armed hostilities. Research shows that the fall of Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 led to the arms flow down south. Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) across the region benefit from the movement of arms across borders, pushing violent group interests in many locations in the West African sub-region.

According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), countries in West Africa need to collaborate and stem the tide of weapons flowing from the Niger Republic. Porous border challenges between Nigeria and the Niger Republic increase the likelihood of arms flowing into Nigeria’s troubled violence hotbeds. Winning wars against NSAGs in one country without adequate measures from their neighbours indicates that weapons could move to the waiting arms of criminal networks in those countries where governments have not handled security effectively. ISS’s report affirms that a solution to Libya’s current crisis could increase arms trafficking in neighbouring countries as local demands decreases.

Instability in West Africa is a complex situation requiring isolated and coordinated strategies amongst national governments. Stability in one country could lead to armed actors and weapons movement to less stable neighbouring countries. Therefore, while combative responses are deployed across West Africa’s violent conflict scenes, they should be harmonised towards a holistic regional stability strategy. For instance, four decades after ratifying the Protocol on Free Movement for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and related Protocol on transhumance, it has contributed to the indirect promotion of non-state violence, according to a Nextier SPD publication. There is a need to amend the ECOWAS free movement protocol to meet the current security exigencies troubling the region. Like the Gulf of Guinea, where multi-pronged cooperation is argued as one of the causal factors for reduced piracy, transnational cooperation among the LCB towards porous borders and its discontents may address the issues. Additionally, transnational border management should be preceded by improved efforts by relevant agencies of the respective countries.

Armed groups may have capitalised on existing grievances, conflicts and social inequalities to unleash attacks on security forces and civilian populations. National governments of affected countries must solve inherent socio-economic and political inadequacies that may be fuelling the violent uprising by non-state armed groups and tendencies of violence spillover. Nigeria has witnessed similar trends with attacks on rural residents, herding groups and farming communities. New tensions are also emerging in southern Nigeria, with violent schisms between communities and herding groups, militants, and pro-secessionists versus the Nigerian state. These different dynamic security challenges trigger widespread instability and subsequent state fragility. Achieving stability in West Africa requires national strategies that feed into a holistic regional framework.

Attacks by criminal groups have become the new normal for several communities across Nigeria. Security intelligence has not significantly prevented some attacks from happening nor nipped them in the bud. Arguably, there is a disconnect between security responses, residents and local intelligence. Also, the rise of informal non-state security actors has not directly led to a robust collaboration between the public and security agencies. Instead, there appears to be a disjointed array of combative responses by state and non-state security providers to rising violent criminality in the country.

Despite the new waves of resilience in many communities prone to attacks, some challenges have persisted. Community vigilance has not made it to the front burner of security discourses and arrangements. Therefore, the rise of security consciousness and informal security provisions have not been reflected in community vigilance and rapid responses. For instance, the apprehended suspects of the Owo massacre were said to have been hosted by a community resident. Also, in bandits-rampaged locations in northwest and northcentral, several conspirators and informants of the bandits\’ groups have been arrested. In May 2022, the Police in Anambra state accused residents of unwillingness to provide information about gunmen terrorising the state.

While informal security provisions increase, they should lead to greater community vigilance and state-society security collaborations. Nigeria\’s security organisations should increase their engagement with the public in building partnerships toward crime prevention and combative response. Trust deficits enable the disconnect between the public and the police force and, by extension, other security organisations. Also, the trend significantly contributes to the incidents of mob violence or jungle justice. A 2014 survey conducted by NOI-POLL, a country-specific polling service in West Africa, revealed that 51 per cent of Nigerians attribute the high prevalence of jungle justice to a \’lack of trust in the law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the spread of informal security provisioning should mean increased state-community collaborations on securitisation.

Community and security operatives should be reconnected. Stability in Nigeria\’s violent hotbeds cannot be guaranteed or sustained without the cooperation of residents. Nigerian security operatives need to create fruitful collaborations between them and the public. War against criminal groups should be seen as a collective effort, not security agents\’ exclusive reserve. Nigeria\’s security operatives must work with community stakeholders while solidifying synergy across all law enforcement units. Securitisation in fragile regions should be based on a local approach that involves community members. There are strong arguments that policing in small communities is easier because community members know themselves and most people live up to the community\’s shared ideals to be regarded as esteemed community members. The argument also holds that the system of informal rewards and punishments is the most potent aid to law enforcement in such places.

Nigeria\’s security operatives should support the informal structures that serve as law enforcement in areas prone to attacks. Banditry in the North-west usually occurs in rural areas. The involvement of local people with bandits suggests that informal structures that keep people in check have either failed or are too weak to hold people accountable. These informal structures include traditional institutions, religious organisations, and locally-based civil society groups. Security agencies in the country should seek the support of these valuable informal actors through strategic meetings, workshops and projects. Applying a non-combative approach to insecurity will drive local support for the law enforcement agencies and establish fruitful partnerships for local intelligence and collaboration in crime prevention. The people must be able to feel the commitment of the Nigerian forces toward their well-being and protection. Effective communication and public partnerships will help restore public confidence, leading to crime prevention and rapid responses. The tide of insecurity in Nigeria requires a holistic sense of ownership and involvement of all in addressing the challenges.

Nigeria is home to volunteer vigilantism and other state-funded armed groups. The rise of armed conflicts across the country and overstretched security agencies have given room for self-help and calls for non-state security alternatives. Jihadist terrorists, bandits, cultists, violent separatists, ‘unknown gunmen’ and hoodlums are spread across the country, leading to violent incidents and fatalities. Nigeria’s security agencies continue to respond to the ubiquity of threats. However, a decline in incidents and deaths appears unending. Several communities are still vulnerable to attacks, and relatively peaceful locations are not immune.

Volatile communities and others around the hotspots seek protection elsewhere and within. Community-led self-defence groups are joining the conflict theatre. Also, state governments are creating regional and state-level security frameworks to combat terror. These efforts are increasing actors in Nigeria’s crowded circle of conflicts. Furthermore, utterances from some high-profile political officeholders encourage the emergence of self-defence groups and the acquisition of weapons for protection. The Nigerian state’s idealistic monopoly of the instrument of violence is punctured by menacing non-state armed actors and, more recently, the rise of ‘unregulated self-defence militias.

The spread of self-defence groups does not assure a peaceful future. Arguably, the increasing need for self-protection suggests the resignation that the Nigerian state is incapable of providing protection despite the social contract. It is also an enabler of a crisis of confidence, where people do not believe a government is working properly and may no longer support it. Therefore, resorting to self-help may be driven by the need for stability, but it may also create additional problems. The International Crisis Group affirms that the spread of vigilante organisations in Nigeria is helping authorities fight crime and insurgency and exacerbating these problems.

Despite filling in for security organisations, the new normal is problematic given Nigeria’s diversity. Several informal security units are formed on identity lines. Therefore, without adequate regulations, such groups may become weaponised and deployed for group conflict. For example, the farmer-herder crisis has often led to armed clashes between the socio-economic groups, with each group claiming self-defence and protection. The Eastern Security Network (ESN) was purported to protect Igbo lives and properties. Self-groups may also be on primitive groups’ interests that threaten the safety of Nigeria’s other demographics. Such scenarios will undermine the security operations of formal institutions and, invariably, Nigeria’s national security.

Armed and unregulated quasi-security units are threats to the 2023 general elections in Nigeria. Nigeria has a history of electoral violence, so elections are keenly contested along identity lines and party affiliations. Since formal security agencies are often indicted for electoral violence, the occurrence may not be different with informal security units, which are significantly under-trained, unregulated and often identity-based. Therefore, there is a need for holistic regulations for the creation and operation of unorthodox securitisation measures across Nigeria. Such regulations should be led by regional and state-level efforts of sub-national governments to establish them. However, the Nigerian Police Force should also provide nationally-backed coverage and regulation of such units.

There is a need for informal security outfits to be regulated in line with conflict and cultural sensitivities in the target areas. Informal security units must hinge on the assumption that such platforms’ idea is to securitise communities and not pique entities against entities. Nigeria’s security crisis is far from checkmated, so informal security actors may continue to increase. Therefore, the creation of supposedly supportive quasi-security units must be preceded by adequate awareness training to enhance the operatives’ knowledge of working in conflict zones. Neutrality, respect for human rights and professionalism will help avoid the looming dangers of tensions between informal security divisions and communities. A robust punishment and reward strategy within the security organisations will help shape the conduct of security personnel in the field. The Nigerian government must tactically regulate the activities of informal security providers to ensure sustainable stability. Informal security units must be fully committed to complementing securitisation efforts rather than complicating them.

Southeast Nigeria has witnessed a steady rise in violent secessionism in the last two years. Fifty-two years after the horrendous Nigeria/Biafra civil war, resentments and agitations in the region have not died down. The proscribed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) champion current secessionist struggles, which have seen a rise in violence and deaths linked to the struggle since the end of the civil war in 1970. Crisis types such as armed robbery, communal clashes, cultism, attacks by “unknown gunmen” and hoodlums, kidnapping and assassinations have created an unsafe atmosphere in the relatively calm region, buzzing with market activities. According to the Nextier Violent Conflict Database, 2,453 incidents occurred within the last two years, leading to 9,635 deaths. The top three most violent states in the Southeast are Imo, Anambra and Enugu, with 128, 112, and 65 incidents, respectively.

Southeast’s lull and losses may continue. Security responses from federal and state governments-backed forces are waging war against the violent uprising. However, achieving peace in the region is complicated. IPOB launched its operation based on a perceived marginalisation of the Igbo people, found in the southeast and parts of south-south Nigeria. Resentments from the civil war also add to the current agitations, signalling that post-conflict healing was either unsuccessful or did not happen. The wide compliance to sit-at-home orders by IPOB indicates two possibilities: many of the region’s residents are wary of IPOB’s assault on defaulters and the government’s inability to protect them, or there is widespread sympathy and support for IPOB’s pro-secession campaigns. Indicatively, the Nigerian state may ‘win the war in the region and lose peace’.

Unrelenting agitations in the Southeast is an eye-opener. The horrific details of the Nigerian/Biafra civil war did not forestall new agitations, nor did it push the Nigerian state from mitigating the triggers of new violence. Current secession agitations have a bearing on perceptions of marginalisation and insecurity. For example, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), the armed wing of IPOB, was purportedly created to protect Igbo lives and properties. IPOB’s leader, Nnamdi Kanu, is still on trial for treason. IPOB had recently warned that peace in the southeast lies with their detained leader. Some responses from the region’s residents affirm that a speedy and fair trial of IPOB’s leader may restore stability in the area. Others claim that security agencies’ high-handedness will undermine stability in the region. Amnesty International\’s report of repressive campaigns by Nigerian security forces supports this assertion. Despite repressive government responses, recurrent pro-secession calls require a holistic and sustainable action plan.

Unpacking the Southeast’s violence requires evidence and local engagement. Interventions in the region must be based on analysing the tracked information. It will provide insights to intervening actors on violence triggers, modus operandi of armed actors and periods of attacks. This will also help identify and classify the violent actors. For example, there are arguments that beyond violent secession struggles in the region, other criminal elements, either secession group factions or independent actors, are capitalising on the uncertain security climate. Therefore, a robust analysis of the data from the region will provide evidence for the government and relevant actors to intervene and manage the crisis. Reliable data and local intelligence will guide combative responses and ensure they do not complicate the security situation.

Government must continue non-combative approaches to salvage the Southeast. Probing extrajudicial killings in the region should open up platforms for reporting unauthorised killings. The process will pass the message of social justice and accountability. Government can counteract the narrative that security responses in the region are biased and repressive. Professionalism and clear rules of engagement would help improve civil-military relations and mitigate future harm, enhancing mission effectiveness in the area. Furthermore, a speedy and fair trial of IPOB’s leader will echo the government’s commitment to the rule of law, respect for human rights and stability in the southeast region.

Ongoing violent conflicts and resource scarcity in Nigeria are harbingers of polarisation. Across Nigeria, perceptions of poor governance, unequal resource allocation, violent conflicts, climate change and humanitarian crisis deepen an \’us-versus-them\’ orientation among Nigeria\’s different demographics. Moreover, the perception of the government\’s mismanagement of public funds and marginalisation breeds grievance and instability, as portrayed in the Niger Delta militancy and the ongoing secession agitations in Southeast Nigeria. Beyond this, the government\’s responses also appear to fuel the embers of polarisation. For instance, security responses in Southeast Nigeria are viewed by some residents as oppressive to self-rule struggles in the region, especially with the nation\’s President coming from the northern part of the country.

Furthermore, group identities have been amplified and weaponised due to the rise of violent conflicts, humanitarian crises and climate change impacts. Violent incidents and climate change have birthed and increased sub-populations such as internally displaced persons, host communities, indigenes, settlers, repentant terrorists and militants. Socio-economic struggles are along old identities and new ones. Resources are either not evenly distributed or sufficient for the growing population and new needs. As a result, there is a rise in communal clashes among the different groups over limited and shrinking resources. Clear examples are the tensions between displaced populations and host communities, pastoralists fleeing violent conflicts and climate change in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and moving southward to be engrossed in violent conflict with sedentary farming communities, whose livelihoods are also affected by insecurity, low yield and rapid industrialisation.

The Nextier Violent Conflict Database show a steady rise in group violence across Nigeria. Tracked data for 2021 show the nation recorded 174 incidents resulting in 654 deaths. About 406 deaths from 122 violent cases have been reported in the first half of 2022. Recurrent crisis types include inter-communal clashes over access to land, farmer-herder clashes, cultism, and mob violence. The exponential rise in group violence hinders more people from accessing livelihood opportunities and increases the struggle over access to land resources and public goods. Stability and social cohesion are weakened by the array of violent actors, limited livelihoods, food insecurity and climatic pressures.

The 2022 analysis of the Fragile States Index by the Funds for Peace holds that although Nigeria and her Lake Chad Basin (LCB) neighbours are not in the top-five most worsened list, they rank poorly in refugees, internally displaced persons and security apparatus. Due to the ongoing insurgency, armed banditry and communal crisis, about 2.9 million people are displaced in Northern Nigeria. Moreover, new displacements and humanitarian needs may worsen, given the protracted conflicts across the board.

Managing Nigeria\’s fragile peace means engaging in several evidence-driven interventions. The responses to numerous violent conflicts in Nigeria should be tailored to the specific realities of the conflict and the environment. This should include a conflict sensitivity component to ensure interventions do not worsen the realities of impacted communities. It should also capture the sensitivities of the different demographics in the conflict location. For example, interventions to mitigate the farmer-herder crisis in Nigeria should adequately accommodate the major conflict groups\’ specific concerns. Also, the security interventions in Southeast Nigeria should be tactical and not support the propaganda of federal government-sanctioned repression against agitators and people in the region. Lack of conflict sensitivity considerations can undermine interventions and worsen the realities of communities facing instability.

Given rising violent conflict hotspots across Nigeria that require state attention and resource, the Nigerian government must increase early warning and early response (EWER) mechanisms to forestall terror spread. Also, non-conflict interventions (NCIs) are ideal for capturing the buy-in of aggrieved groups and affected communities. Nextier SPD Policy Weekly argues that government needs to increase NCIs to win people\’s support and attract conflict actors to the negotiation table for sustainable peacebuilding. The Nigerian government must rethink and evaluate its responses to Nigeria\’s myriad of violent conflict hotbeds.