Long Walk to Forgiveness

Forgiveness for \’ex-Boko Haram fighters\’ will be a bumpy ride. Since 2016, the Nigerian government have extended olive branches to \’low-risk repentant terrorists\’ through the Operation Safe Corridor (OSC). The Nigerian Army manages the OSC programme as part of its counterinsurgency strategy to end the twelve years of insurgency in northeast Nigeria. About 881 ex-fighters have been processed out of the rehabilitation exercise.  The demise of Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, in May 2021, and in-fighting between the new leadership of Boko Haram and the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) have triggered the massive return of \’repentant\’ fighters. The Nigerian Army has also attributed this development to the increased military crackdown on insurgents.  According to the military, about 18,000 Boko Haram fighters and their families have surrendered to the army. However, beyond the homecoming, forgiving returnee fighters is a tough call for communities affected by the insurgency.

Boko Haram-impacted communities may neither forgive nor forget too soon. In 2018, members of conflict-affected communities maintained that they do not want the return of rehabilitated ex-fighters, according to a report by Brookings Institute. In November 2021, residents of Maiduguri, a city that has borne most of the violence, laid siege in a returnee insurgents\’ detention camp. According to security sources, the residents, armed with swords, daggers and clubs, planned to prevent rioting returnees from leaving the camp \’alive\’. The siege reaffirmed resentments and suspicion towards \’repentant fighters. It gives an idea of public acceptance of the returnees and the rehabilitation processes.

Years of terror and continued vulnerabilities does little to aid public acceptance of ex-fighters. Justifiably, communities may be unwilling to accept repentant fighters due to the twelve years of anguish, endless conflict, and humanitarian crisis the war have engendered. About 350,000 people have died from the carnage, and 2.6 million people displaced in the Northeast and broader Lake Chad Basin. Nearly 8.7 million people require urgent humanitarian relief. The war is far from over, and the humanitarian crisis has not been substantially managed. The travail of the war is endless for many residents despite combative and non-combative interventions. Preaching forgiveness to residents requires a comprehensive strategy; from the rehabilitation process to stakeholder buy-in and reintegration strategies.

Returnee fighters, residents and experts fault the process of rehabilitation and reintegration. The riots by ex-fighters in a detention camp in Maiduguri suggests possible challenges with the OSC programme. A report by the International Crisis Group, claims that the OSC is struggling to bring in the right people, with some people mistakenly categorised as ex-fighters and channelled into the programme. The report also highlights the \”horrific conditions\” and extended detention periods in the camps. Some Northeast residents beyond the hostilities claim many returnees are not remorseful but rather are Boko Haram fighters fleeing from ISWAP\’s wrath. In August 2021, a Nextier SPD article warned that the government should adequately screen and manage hundreds of returnee fighters to disaggregate remorseful insurgents from those fleeing from ISWAP.

Implementing a successful defector programme for ex-fighters must include reassessing the OSC programme, engendering community buy-in and a sustainable exit strategy for OSC graduates. There is a need to conduct an independent assessment of the OSC programme. The evaluation should document the programme\’s objectives against its outcomes, current challenges and lessons learnt. The rationale is to have reliable data for revamping the programme in light of current issues as highlighted by the stakeholders. A credible assessment will provide government and donor agencies reliable insights on how to scale up the programme\’s activities for sustained impact and value for money.

Safe passage for low-risk ex-fighters must begin and end with communities\’ buy-in. Since 2016 when OSC started, conversations of public acceptance have been unending and inexhaustive. Therefore, the government must review its stakeholder component of the OSC rationale and processes to ensure communities affected by the insurgency are carried along. For example, sensitisation campaigns and workshops should be upscaled to promote the advantages of the OSC programme. The activities must also include socio-economic and psychosocial support to communities most affected by the conflict. Additionally, an independent survey is required to better document the concerns of community members regarding the OSC programme and how residents think it should be managed. Insights from the survey will help to inform policies and programming around the rehabilitation and reintegration of repentant insurgents.

A revamped OSC programme based on reliable data from the assessments and survey will help the government and donor agencies better utilise budgeted resources for degrading violent extremism in the Northeast and the broader Lake Chad Basin. Moreover, the OSC programme should incorporate more realistic and sustainable rehabilitation and exit strategies for the participants. Furthermore, the period of rehabilitation and reintegration should include increased efforts to engender self-reliance amongst the participants. Nigeria\’s quest to degrade violent extremism in the Northeast through the OSC is a bumpy ride if sustainable, people-centred and evidence-informed solutions are not adopted.