Nine Days to Uncertainty?

In nine days, governorship elections will hold in Anambra, one of the core Igbo states witnessing fierce Biafran self-determination struggle in southeast Nigeria. Although typical of cut-throat atmosphere towards several elections in Nigeria, more emphasis is on the uncertain security climate in the state and the broader southeast zone. The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), the secessionist group currently championing the Pro-Biafran campaign, is at the heart of these concerns. IPOB, arguably, runs a shadow government through its dozens of sit-at-orders and warnings that have enjoyed widespread compliance despite government’s assurances of public safety.

With the election holding on 6th November 2021, IPOB has declared a stay-at-home command from 5th till 10th November 2021. The order is to compel the unyielding Federal Government to release its leader, Nnamdi Kanu, who is on trial for terrorism. Meanwhile, Nigeria’s Security Advisor, Major Gen. Babagana Monguno, held that security agencies were ready for the elections. Going by these reports, possible scenarios suggest that IPOB will clash with security agencies in its enforcement of the sit-at-home order. A lesser volatile scene would be a low voter turnout due to security concerns. Either outcome will mirror the increasingly unsafe southeast atmosphere, the state’s substantially challenged authority and a rebellious IPOB, governing in the shadows.

This show of authority was predicted. A Nextier SPD article, Emerging Violence Theatre, argues about IPOB’s unreliable position on elections in the region, sighting the group’s insistence that it has not officially declared no election in Anambra state back in September. Irrespective of the group’s unclear positions, the article explains the uncertainty of peaceful electoral activities in the state. Another article, IPOB: Shadow Government, portrays IPOB’s growing influence in the region, especially with notable compliance to stay-at-home orders.

What happens if the upcoming polls should go as predicted? On the one hand, apathetic voters are impediments to Nigeria’s democratisation process. It is even more so to the state\’s monopoly of authority and the instrument of violence if a separatist group largely induces it. It registers a lack of confidence in government’s ability to maintain public safety and trust to mobilise citizens to participate in civic affairs. On the other hand, it denies citizens the rights and the opportunity to participate in the election for democratic and accountability purposes.

Can the elections still be salvaged? Government’s response to violent upheavals, including separatist agitations, has been repressive. Declaring readiness for the polls suggest that the election may be heavily militarised. However, government should look to other alternative pathways. First, there is a need to reduce repression and introduce communicative engagement with secession groups. The engagement process is expected to reduce the security tensions and set the path for mutually assured peace. For this to work, both parties in the conflict must commit to certain responsibilities such as zero violence, adherence to rules of engagement and maintenance of public safety.

There is a need to counter brewing public perception of safety. For example, sit-at-home orders in the southeast have received relative compliance despite IPOB announcing its discontinuity. However, some people still face attacks on former stay-at-home designated days. Therefore, through tailored messaging, stakeholder engagement, and securitisation, the Nigerian government must counter these trends. Messaging programmes, publicised stakeholder engagement platforms, and security operations must be increased in the area.

Additionally, security deployment in the region must be tactical and fair to ensure it does not create tensions it is statutorily obligated to manage. Furthermore, government\’s show of commitment to engage should be exemplified in a fair trial of the separatist group’s incarcerated members and professional policing in the crises hotspots. Finally, the Nigerian government must be open to alternative and cost-effective approaches in managing the southeast rebellion.