Northeast Trojan Horses?

The acceptance of \’repentant\’ Boko Haram fighters is a long and uncertain journey. About 20,000 fighters have surrendered to the Nigerian forces, new reports reveal. However, the latest concerns are that many returnee insurgents are not truly remorseful. According to a Nigerian Army Chief, \’repentant\’ sect members are not sincere, and some have ulterior motives. The Army Chief claims the issue is subverting counterterrorism warfare in the region. This revelation will cast doubts on the effectiveness of the amnesty programme for low-risk jihadist fighters in the northeast. Nevertheless, since 2016, the Nigerian Army, through Operation Safe Corridor (OSC), have \’successfully\’ rehabilitated 881 \’repentant\’ terrorists.

The world may be witnessing a travesty of remorse. In August 2021, the Nigerian Army paraded \’repentant\’ jihadist fighters carrying placards with inscriptions such as \”Nigerians, please forgive us\”, \”forget terrorism, embrace peace\”, and \”Borno state remains the home of peace\”. The placard bearers are former gun-wielding members of Boko Haram. Moreover, the August show of repentance is expected to dilute the resentments towards members of terrorist organisations. Recall, there is endless suspicion and dislike for the Nigerian state\’s OSC activities. The recent Army Chief\’s revelations mean the OSC processes cannot disaggregate truly \’repentant\’ fighters from those fleeing the wrath of the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP), which may fuel public outcry against the process and will strain opportunities for \’repentant\’ insurgents\’ acceptance.

Many northeast residents are not ready for repentant terrorists, and new revelations will prolong the process. Since 2018, members of conflict-affected communities have maintained that they do not want the reintegration of rehabilitated ex-fighters, according to a report. In November 2021, residents of Maiduguri, a city that has borne most of the violence, laid siege in a returnee insurgents\’ detention camp. According to security sources, the residents, armed with swords, daggers and clubs, planned to prevent rioting returnees from leaving the camp \’alive\’. The mass return of ex-jihadist fighters does not sway many northeast inhabitants. Indeed, the Army Chief\’s revelation may even fuel the arguments against the amnesty programme for low-risk repentant insurgents. The Nigerian government will struggle to gain the support of conflict-impacted communities on the OSC mandate.

The new revelations must lead to new improvements. Over the years, some analysts have identified improvement opportunities for amnesty programmes in the Lake Chad Basin. A report by the International Crisis Group, claims that the OSC is struggling to bring in the right people, with some people mistakenly categorised as ex-fighters and channelled into the programme. According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), DDR programmes should recognise the nuances in the different classes of ex-combatants, including those captured and who did not surrender voluntarily. Given the new dynamics of the jihadist conflict, especially between Boko Haram and ISWAP, Nigeria\’s OSC strategy should put in measures to identify truly repentant terrorists and those fleeing from ISWAP. The DDR processes should be updated in line with the current dynamics of northeast jihadist warfare.

Conflict-impacted communities\’ involvement is an unending conversation as long as the OSC programme continues. Therefore, the Nigerian government must engage communities that have suffered the realities of the jihadist war. An ISS report notes that lack of community acceptance limits successful reintegration and rehabilitation of processed ex-fighters. People need to believe in the amnesty process. Consequently, it is important to develop a continuous community engagement on the acceptance of ex-fighters. The ability of processed repentant insurgents to become law-abiding and productive members of society depends on the level of community acceptance and reconciliation they receive.

Achieving community support is a two-pronged fork. First, government must mobilise international support to increase humanitarian interventions in the conflict-affected communities. Communities are more likely to engage if the realities of the war have been addressed to a considerable length. It will also help counteract the perception that there is a greater reward for being on the side of terror. Second, the amnesty programme for ex-fighters must be comprehensive and updated in line with the current dynamics of northeast jihadist warfare. The programme should prevent the infiltration of the camps by unrepentant fighters with ulterior motives. The mass return of insurgents should lead to improved OSC processes and continuous community engagements across the board. Nigeria must prevent the infiltration of its rehabilitation camps by trojan horses.