The Zamfara Paradox: Peace Deals, No Security

The Zamfara State government has, in addition to hard security, relied on an appeasement strategy to address pervasive banditry in the sprawling area. In recent years, the state government has extended many peace deals to criminals and terrorists known locally as ‘bandits’ to mitigate their campaigns of violence.

In a recent justification of appeasement, the deputy governor of Zamfara State disclosed that government’s romance with the notorious bandit kingpin, Bello Turji, who had masterminded the kidnap and killing of several persons, was yielding positive results. The deputy governor, Hassan Nasiha, said, “Turji is now killing unrepentant bandits who unleashed terror on innocent citizens in Shinkafi, Zurmi and Birnin Magaji local government areas”.

However, Byman (2006) argues that talking with terrorists has some potential rewards, such as encouraging dissent within the group by swaying the opinions of its constituents. Yet, the ceasefire provided by such overture could lead to an eventual reward of violence by giving recognition to terrorists and enabling them to buy time, raise funds and rearm. Besides, terrorists often relapse after renouncement, making the government look foolish.

Against this background, this edition of Nextier SPD Policy Weekly examines the dangers posed by the (ab)use of peace deals by the government and the bandits in Zamfara State.

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